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OPERATIONAL ALERTING CONCEPT FOR COMMERCIAL SINGLE PILOT
OPERATIONS SYSTEMS
J.P.Reitsma, M.M.van Paassen, M. Mulder
Delft University of Technology,
2629 HS Delft, the Netherlands
Reducing high workload levels are a major challenge to enable single pilot
operations. Where the pilot is currently supported with many automated systems,
the role of mission planner is relatively unsupported, i.e., the flight crew is
required to integrate and combine information from various sources to extract the
implications on the missions’ high-level goals to determine if the mission can still
be completed safely and successfully. An operational alerting display is
developed to provide the pilot with a clear overview of the current and future
operational flight constraints. This enables the pilot to determine if the initial plan
is valid under the existing conditions. The display is not limited to system
malfunctions, but combines the full spectrum of operational constraints, e.g.,
weather and airport operations. The display concept was tested on usability with a 
commercial pilot to provide a preliminary performance indication on the
effectiveness of the concept.
Reduced pilot operations (RPO) for commercial flights is predicted to reduce direct
operation costs, Bilimoria (2014). Other costs reductions can be found on both the operating and 
manufacturing side. Furthermore, RPO could reduce the issue of the projected pilot shortage.
These factors make a strong business case, especially for short haul operations. It is therefore not
surprising that there is much interest from industry for RPO. However, major challenges have to 
be resolved in order to enable such operations. One of the challenges is to handle high workload 
situations. It is likely that automated systems will relieve the pilot in command from many tasks, 
Harris (2007). Especially, the system management task will likely to be, at least partially, being 
taken over by automated systems. The pilot would be in command of all the automation
resources, but what remains crucial is that the pilot is aware of the implications of the systems
for the safe and expeditious conduct of the flight. The role of the pilot will be that of a flight
planner (both on a strategic and tactical level); a communicator with ATM facilities, and a
surveillance operative, Harris (2007).
Currently, obtaining information to determine if the flight plan is affected is a rather
taxing and time-consuming task. Integrating information from the various sources and converting 
them to operational constraints is becoming more supported for certain applications. However, it 
is still much relying on pilots’ experience and expertise, Bailey (2017). In this paper, a flight
plan evaluation tool is designed with the objective to support the operator more effectively, i.e.
reducing workload of determining the implications of events introduced by system and the
environment. In-flight, the pilot is mainly evaluating the flight plan constraints and modifying 
the plan if necessary. Therefore, enabling effective evaluation is an essential step to enable
effective flight planning.
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The flight plan evaluation support has been developed with Applied Cognitive Work 
Analysis methodology introduced by Elm (2003). It is a pragmatic framework to determine in a 
stepwise and traceable manner information and presentation requirements. The requirements are
based on an expert knowledge model, the Functional Abstraction Network (FAN). This model is
built with operating manuals and interviews with subject matter experts. From the model,
cognitive work requirements are derived, from which information requirements are derived. That
ultimately feed into presentation requirements. This set of requirements on both information and 
presentation objectively guide the visual form in terms of content. The concept itself can take
many visual forms, which can be adjusted to optimize usability and interaction. 
Method
The initial concepts are static, not interactive pictures, displaying a normal and non-
normal scenario. The concept was tested on usability for two non-normal conditions, i.e. a
hydraulic failure and a generator drive failure similar to recent experiments performed by Bailey 
(2017), with an experienced 737-800 pilot. The objective was to get initial feedback on the
concept and test if the pilot could extract the implications of the failure events.
The pilot was presented with a display of the overhead panel, glare shield and pedestal, 
that represented the flight deck effects in a static manner. The conventional flight deck and the
concept were presented on large LCD displays positioned on a desk. A paper version QRH and 
dispatch information was presented digitally. First, the hydraulic failure was presented on which 
the pilot had to act, determine the implications and decide the following actions in a conventional
way. After, he was presented with the concept and asked if the consequences were as he initially 
had considered. This was repeated with the generation drive failure. After each scenario, features
of the display were discussed.
The scenario was a flight from London Stansted to Innsbruck. The events were injected at
the location of 15 minutes prior to top of descent, west of Zurich. Alternate airport was planned 
to be Salzburg. In scenario 1, conditions of runway 08 at LOWI had a braking action of medium
forcing to divert.
Result
The FAN captures the high-level goals of commercial flight operation. In order to 
successfully and sustainably create value as a company with flight operation, the company needs
to guarantee safety, compliance, expected comfort levels and operate according to flight schedule
within the estimated budgeted costs. These five factors are the high-level goals that need to be
satisfied to make the operation to a success. The operation itself can be classified into three types
of movement, namely the movement of the vehicle in air, the movement of the vehicle on the
ground and the movement of the passengers/payload. All these types of movement introduce
specific functions, e.g. braking with landing gear is only applicable on the ground. This first
concept, for the moment, includes only flight and ground operations of the vehicle.
Two types of abstract functional blocks, namely path and space, where found that can be
used to determine if a flight plan is still satisfying the higher-level goals, i.e. safety, compliance,
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schedule, cost and comfort. One can define paths and spaces for each of these high-level goals,
for example compliance space (defined by intentional constraints) is generally more restricted 
than the safe space (defined by causal constraints).
The functions introduced by the system and environment can restrict the path 
horizontally, vertically, in velocity or in time. The path needs to be within the operating space in 
order to be unrestricted. The restrictions of the path and space are the result of lower level
functions for example, the maneuvering capability, resources, navigation, surveillance,
communication, ability to protect the payload and planes health and so on. These lower level
functions are enabled by the power generation functions, i.e. electrical, mechanical, hydraulic,
pneumatic. If these systems don’t function properly, the complete system is not able to perform
certain paths any longer. Multiple flight plans can be analyzed by applying the path and space
principle and from interviews pilots it was found that pilots are actually assessing multiple flight
plans mentally, i.e. the normal flight plan to the planned destination but also the contingency 
plans, e.g. to an alternate airport and/or nearest airport in case of diversion.
The basic principles of path and space are applied to the safety and compliant goals, for
simplification purposes at the moment. The initial concept is presented in Figure 1, shows how
the space is restricted horizontal and vertically, how the path is restricted horizontally (top view
display in the center), vertically, in time and velocity (with time/distance display) related to 
safety and compliance. Furthermore, it shows which systems (bottom right) and environmental
effects (bottom center) imply these restrictions.
Normal condition
Figure 1.
Flight plan evaluation concept in the normal condition.
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The flight plans under current evaluation are presented in on the left-hand side in Figure
1, the landing phase is shown at the top and the current leg or ‘now’ effects are presented on the
bottom. It shows all the waypoints. The cause of the restrictions is presented in the list at the leg 
where it will be affected.
The airports in the center display are color-coded based on the conditions and ability to
land safely and within the standard operating procedures. Further, the contingency plans are
displayed in cyan. Restricted space is presented as grey, where black is unrestricted space. The
paths are color-coded with amber or red in case any restrictions are broken. The cause of the
restriction can be obtained from the list.
Non-Normal condition
In figure 2, the effects on the path and space are shown for a hydraulic system A failure.
The landing distance is increased and the alternate plan (LOWI, go/around, divert to alternate), is
not safe any longer due to increased fuel consumption due to the inability to retract the gear once
lowered, which reduced the final reserve fuel under 30 minutes at LOWS. On the button right,
the hydraulic power generation sources are reduced to one out of two and the hydraulic fluid is
low. Furthermore, Autopilot A is not available any longer, which has the result that the minimum
usable height is increased to 158 ft, which has the consequence that CAT II ILS at LOWS RWY
15 is not authorized.
Figure 2.
Flight plan evaluation concept in the non-normal condition of a hydraulic failure.
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First impressions
The first impression was that the majority of the attention was focused on the list with the
operational effects. The system status and the time / distance display were not used much. The
pilot had a clear picture, from the conventional method (QRH and performance tables), that
LOWI with braking action less than good was not a safe option, therefore the fact that the item
about landing distance increased in the list was not a surprise. However, that implied that trying 
an approach and lowering the gear was not considered to be realistic. This caused a mismatch 
with the thinking process. The question that remained was where to divert to. For that case the
support is, in its current form, too leading, i.e. only a divert to Zurich is shown. Where, other
fields were also a feasible option(s) worth reviewing, e.g. direct to LOWS or another closer
airport. Preferred is full option space to choose the suitable diversion airport and not a single
indicated path.
Besides this, the link between the system failure to the actual consequence was not
always understood. Determining what operational effects were caused by what
system/environment effect was not always clear. For example, separating between the effects of
an inoperative autopilot and the result of the load shedding was not easy. Also, the feeling
existed that some steps were skipped in restoring the systems and the consequences were shown 
too pessimistic. This included that the cabin altitude pressurization auto mode was inoperative in 
the second scenario. The feeling existed that it could have be restored by switching it to alternate
mode and not fully in manual operating mode.
Furthermore, the list of legs and affected items is presented future-up and felt
counterintuitive since the waypoints listed in the FMS are presented the other way around.
Another comment was that the time/distance display, especially for ground operations display 
was not very usable, since it is very difficult to accurately predict taxi time and merely an 
indication would be sufficient.
Discussions
These initial findings show that it is challenging to match the presented information to the
operator’s thinking process. If effects or plans do not completely align, a mismatch occurs and 
the concept becomes a burden rather than a support Westin 2015. Wording and conventions need 
to be taken further into consideration. The workflow of the concept should be reconsidered to 
further streamline the process and support the pilot step by step from event to consequence.
Furthermore, the concept in its current form is found to be too leading. The pilot should be given 
more flexibility to evaluate nearest alternates.
The majority of the consequences were extracted in advance using the conventional
manner. Some consequences were not extracted at first glance, especially which approaches are
authorized, e.g. CATII and RNAV. The reason for this is could be that weather was not limiting
ILS operations, and the note ‘land at nearest suitable airport’ was making the RNAV approach in
proximity of high terrain not favorable, when compared to a closer large international airport
with multiple runways and approach types.
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Linking the consequences and system effects was not completely clear. This might be due
to the physical distance between the system status display and the flight plan list. The time /
distance display was not found to be effective yet. However, the plan that was affected by time
and speed constraints was a plan that was found to be not a realistic option for the pilot. 
Currently, expected arrival time and fuel are presented by the FMS by two lines, which is less
difficult to comprehend than the time/distance display. Scenarios in which time/speed restrictions
play a crucial role should be tested to determine if the potential of this display. This initial test
was performed statically and the pilot was given as much time as he required. This doesn’t
represent the real environment, in which interruptions occur, and time is limited. Furthermore,
the display was not interactive yet. 
Conclusions
The designed concept to evaluate flight plan constraints was designed and tested on 
usability. This initial feedback provided great insight on how important it is to align the display 
to the metal workflow of the pilot. Guiding the pilot through the complete process, i.e. from
event to consequence, would make it easier to understand the cause-effect relations. The
principle of the path and space restrictions is still very useable, but the pilot should be given
more flexibility to obtain information. Here, the concept will profit from interaction to extract 
relevant information in the right context. The concept will probably proof its value better, with
some initial training and human-in-the-loop experiments under real, dynamic scenarios, which
will be future steps.
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